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There is . . . a peculiar logical pleasure in making manifest the continuity 
between what we are doing and what has been done before. But the present 
has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be 
remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a 
necessity.  
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1920, pp. 139) 
I. RONALD DWORKIN: A EULOGY 
Ronald Dworkin is widely and rightly viewed as the most important legal 
philosopher and constitutional theorist of our time, and as one of the leading 
figures in moral and political philosophy. In the words of Marshall Cohen, 
Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously ‘is the most important work in 
jurisprudence since H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law and, from a 
philosophical point of view at least, the most sophisticated contribution to that 
subject yet made by an American writer’. And Cohen wrote those words about 
Dworkin’s first book in 1977! Dworkin’s many outstanding subsequent books 
and articles made good on that early, prescient assessment. Dworkin is 
unmatched and unrivaled in legal philosophy and constitutional theory. 
Over the years, I have organized a number of conferences in constitutional 
theory, and Dworkin was often the most appropriate keynote speaker. In 
conferences at Fordham University School of Law on ‘Fidelity in 
Constitutional Interpretation’ and ‘Rawls and the Law’, and at Boston 
University School of Law on his book, Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin 
delivered powerful and eloquent keynote lectures (Dworkin 1997; Dworkin 
2004; Dworkin 2010a). The readers of this Essay are likely familiar with the 
countless accounts of Dworkin’s brilliance as a lecturer, of how he spoke 
without notes and with great flair, making it all seem so graceful and effortless. 
Even more impressive, in my experience, was how seriously he took his 
lectures and how energetically he responded to his interlocutors. In the 
conference at Boston University on the penultimate draft of Justice for 
Hedgehogs, held in 2009 when Dworkin was seventy-eight years old, he 
demonstrated his characteristic energy by responding extemporaneously to all 
thirty-one commentators, one panel at a time, and elaborating those initial 
thoughts in a published response (Dworkin 2010b). I had the privilege of 
writing the biographical entry on Dworkin in the Yale Biographical Dictionary 
of American Law, and closed that entry by stating: ‘His work abounds with 
indefatigable energy, giving the impression that he would not stop making 
arguments until he put the clamps of reason upon every rational being’ 
 
 Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and 
Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School of Law. I have 
adapted this Essay from a previously published article (Fleming 2013). I incorporate the 
eulogy to Ronald Dworkin from another piece (Fleming 2014). Thanks to Courtney 
Gesualdi for helpful comments and to Jessica Lees for helpful formatting. 




(Fleming 2009, p. 179). Dworkin substantially revised the draft of Justice for 
Hedgehogs in light of the Boston University Symposium and incorporated 
many of his responses. 
Dworkin’s work in legal philosophy and constitutional theory was so 
powerful and fecund that it could inspire many careers wholly dedicated to 
building upon it and working out its implications. Dworkin (along with John 
Rawls) has been a powerful inspiration for my own work in constitutional 
theory. My Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy puts 
forward a ‘Constitution-perfecting’ theory that aims, in the spirit of Dworkin, 
to interpret the U.S. Constitution so as to make it the best it can be (Fleming 
2006, pp. 4-6, 73-74, 210-11). Sotirios Barber’s and my book, Constitutional 
Interpretation: The Basic Questions, is a response to Dworkin’s call, in Taking 
Rights Seriously, for a ‘fusion of constitutional law and moral theory’ (Barber 
& Fleming 2007, p. xiii (quoting Dworkin 1977, p. 149)). And Linda 
McClain’s and my book, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and 
Virtues, responds to charges that liberals like Dworkin take rights too 
seriously, developing a civic liberalism that takes responsibilities and civic 
virtues – as well as rights – seriously (Fleming & McClain 2013, p. 3). 
Dworkin’s successor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, 
John Gardner, put it well when he said: ‘The loss of Ronnie takes a bit of the 
sparkle out of life as a philosopher of law’ (Gardner 2013). But those who 
knew Dworkin and learned from his teaching and writing will never forget the 
thrill of engaging with him and building upon his work. His sparkling prose, 
the staggering ambition and monumental achievements of his works, and the 
flair and gusto of his arguments and insights will never cease to illuminate and 
inspire. We shall not look upon his like again. Ronald Dworkin made legal 
philosophy and constitutional theory the best they can be. 
II. AGAINST INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE PAST 
Dworkin famously argued that the best interpretation of the Constitution 
should fit and justify the legal materials, for example, the text, original 
meaning, and precedents (Dworkin 1986, p. 239). In his recent book, Against 
Obligation (Greene 2012), Abner Greene provocatively and creatively bucks 
the tendencies of constitutional theorists to profess fidelity with the past in 
constitutional interpretation. He rejects originalist understandings of obligation 
to follow original meaning in interpreting the Constitution, even of the sort 
associated with Jack Balkin’s abstract living originalism (Balkin 2011) (which 
aspires to fidelity to the abstract commitments of, rather than the concrete 
expectations of, the founding generation). And indeed he rejects interpretive 
obligation to follow precedent, even of the type illustrated by David Strauss’s 
flexible living constitutionalism (Strauss 2010). Greene provides powerful 
arguments against views that original meaning and precedent are dispositive of 
constitutional meaning and decision. He argues that we the people today 
should decide questions of constitutional meaning, commitment, and justice for 




In this Essay I focus on Greene’s arguments (2012, pp. 169-71, 192-97, 201-
04) against interpretive obligation to the past, in particular, his argument that 
even constitutional theorists like Ronald Dworkin (1986) and I (2006) give too 
much deference or weight to ‘fit’ and precedent, and not enough primacy to 
‘justification’ and justice, in our approaches to constitutional interpretation. I 
should begin by observing that both Greene and I are, broadly speaking, 
Dworkinians, or moral readers. By that I mean that we conceive the 
Constitution in significant part as a scheme of abstract moral commitments, not 
a code of concrete historical rules. And we conceive interpretation of the 
Constitution as requiring judgments about what interpretation best ‘fits’ and 
‘justifies’ the constitutional document, order, and practice. Interpretation is not 
a matter of discovering and enforcing historically determined answers provided 
by the framers and ratifiers (whether original intentions, understandings, or 
public meanings). 
Hence, it is no surprise that I largely agree with Greene’s account of the 
place of fit and justification in constitutional interpretation. And so, in what 
follows, it may seem like we are having a heated agreement. Even where we 
disagree, it may seem that we are having a family quarrel. But I do think the 
engagement is worthwhile, for it provides an occasion for me to clarify and 
sharpen Dworkin’s and my own arguments about fit, justification, and fidelity 
in constitutional interpretation. This Essay is part of my book in progress 
entitled Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution (Fleming forthcoming). This 
book will criticize all forms of Originalism, and it will further develop my 
arguments in previous books for what Dworkin called a ‘moral reading’ of the 
Constitution (Dworkin 1996) and what I have called a ‘philosophic approach’ 
to constitutional interpretation (Barber & Fleming 2007, pp. 16, 211, 225, 227) 
and a ‘Constitution-perfecting theory’ that would interpret the Constitution so 
as to make it the best it can be (Dworkin 1996; Fleming 2006, pp. 161-63). 
Again, Greene (2012, pp. 161-63) argues against interpretative obligation to 
the past, whether to concrete original meaning or precedents (as he puts it, 
whether to ‘higher’ or ‘prior’ authorities). He makes cogent arguments against 
originalism as conventionally understood. His arguments zero in on 
originalists’ assumptions or claims that we are obligated to follow the original 
understanding or original meaning, concretely conceived as the original 
expected applications of the framers and ratifiers. His arguments also target 
originalists’ aims or claims to avoid making moral and philosophic choices in 
constitutional interpretation. Such choices, he rightly argues, are inevitable and 
indeed desirable. In a nutshell, he shows that originalists unsuccessfully 
attempt to stress fit to the exclusion of justification (Greene 2012, pp. 161, 
165-66, 172-81). 
At the same time, Greene (2012, pp. 169-70, 192-97, 201-04) criticizes 
moral readers like Dworkin (1986) and me (2006) for conceiving constitutional 
interpretation as being too constrained by fit – in particular, by interpretive 
obligation to follow precedents. It seems that, to Greene, Dworkin and I do not 




emphatically that I welcome this criticism! Moral readers like Dworkin and me 
are usually criticized for giving too little room for fit, and too much primacy to 
justification (Sebok 1997, pp. 419-20). Since we are being criticized from both 
sides, I guess we must be doing something right! 
To elaborate, I shall sketch the predicament of moral readers like Dworkin 
and me. In general, no one doubts our commitment to the normative dimension 
of justification in constitutional interpretation. After all, we argue that 
constitutional interpretation is a matter of making moral and philosophical 
judgments about the meanings and implications of our constitutional 
commitments. The challenge we face is to show that we are not just 
elaborating our own liberal commitments for a perfect liberal Constitution 
(Monaghan 1981, p. 364). We make three basic responses to these ‘perfect 
Constitution’ challenges. First, we argue that it is in the nature of constitutional 
interpretation to strive to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it 
can be (Dworkin 1996, p. 38; Dworkin 1986, p. 255). Second, we show that we 
do not believe that the Constitution, even when construed in its best light, is 
perfect. For example, Dworkin (1996, p. 36) concedes that the Constitution 
does not protect welfare rights (rights which his ideal liberal Constitution 
would protect). And I have acknowledged (2006, pp. 220-21) all manner of 
constitutional evil, misfortune, stupidity, and tragedy in our constitutional 
practice. Third, we argue that our liberal constitutional theories fit the 
constitutional document and scheme. They have a firm footing in our extant 
constitutional practice and they are not just normative theories that would 
justify a perfect liberal Constitution (Fleming 2006, pp. 63, 70, 80-1, 92-8). 
Enter my first book, Securing Constitutional Democracy, which Greene 
(2012, pp. 169-71, 192-97, 201-04; 2007, pp. 2926-2948) criticizes for giving 
primacy to fit over justification. Officially, Dworkin’s moral reading (1986, p. 
239) aspires to construct a theory that best fits and justifies our constitutional 
document, order, and practice. Yet many critics believe that Dworkin (to use 
Greene’s terms) has given ‘primacy to justification’ (2012, pp. 12, 201) and 
not enough ‘room for fit’ (2012, p. 204; 2007, p. 2946). They claim that he has 
elaborated a perfect liberal constitution but has not done the concrete 
groundwork necessary to show that his interpretations of the Constitution 
adequately fit our practice, including original meaning and precedents (Greene 
2007, p. 2938). In response, I basically say, ‘Do as Dworkin says, not as he 
does’ (Fleming 1997, p. 1349). That is, even if Dworkin himself may not 
always satisfactorily do the fit work that his own theory calls for, I do take fit 
seriously in my book. I seek to remedy the deficiency of Dworkin’s work by 
making the fit case for a liberal theory of ‘securing constitutional democracy’ 
that protects not only basic procedural liberties associated with deliberative 
democracy, like the right to vote, but also basic substantive liberties associated 
with what I called deliberative autonomy, like the right to marry. Instead of 
simply making a normative argument that justice requires protecting a right to 
individual autonomy, I undertake an archeological excavation of the legal 




substantive due process cases protecting certain basic liberties associated with 
privacy or autonomy (Fleming 2006, pp. 92-8). I ask: what constitutional 
theory would best fit and justify these cases? I argue (2006, p. 92-8) that my 
‘constitutional constructivism’ better fits and justifies these cases than do 
competing theories of originalism (Justice Scalia’s view) or perfecting the 
processes of representative democracy or deliberative democracy (Ely’s and 
Sunstein’s views) (Ely 1980; Sunstein 1993). Yet my taking this ‘fit’ tack – 
doing as Dworkin says, not as he does – is evidently what has prompted 
Greene’s criticism (2012, p. 12) that I give too much deference to fit and 
precedent and fail to give ‘primacy [to] justification’. 
I make three arguments in this Essay. First, I argue that a commitment to fit 
(like that in Dworkin’s work and in my book, Securing Constitutional 
Democracy) does not necessitate commitment to the view that one has an 
interpretive obligation to follow the past – whether concrete original meaning 
or precedents. In short, taking fit seriously ≠ interpretive obligation to follow 
the past. Nevertheless, fit may figure prominently in a sound account of the 
aspiration to fidelity in interpreting the Constitution. 
Second, I argue that interpreters who aspire to fidelity in constitutional 
interpretation have a responsibility to construct an account that not only 
justifies but also fits our constitutional document, order, and practice. But the 
aspiration to fidelity itself does not entail an interpretive obligation to follow 
the past. In short, taking fidelity seriously ≠ interpretive obligation to the past. 
In this section I will comment in more detail on fidelity without obligation and 
without originalism, sketching the account of fidelity in pursuit of our 
aspirations that I am developing in my book in progress, Fidelity to Our 
Imperfect Constitution. 
Third, I argue that fit and justification are co-original and of equal weight, 
instead of justification having ‘primacy’ over while also leaving ‘room for fit’. 
Here I shall say more about fit in relation to justification and fidelity in 
constitutional interpretation. 
III. TAKING FIT SERIOUSLY ≠ INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE 
PAST 
Do Dworkin’s and my commitment to taking fit as well as justification 
seriously entail a commitment to interpretive obligation to follow the past, 
whether concrete original meaning or precedent? In making the ‘fit’ case for 
my theory, I present precedents in the line of substantive due process decisions 
as bones or shards of a constitutional culture, as provisional fixed points that a 
constitutional constructivist archaeologist, or interpreter, has a responsibility to 
fit and justify (Fleming 2006, p. 93). I argue that a constructivist interpreter 
would not be free to cast out the substantive shards and bones in the way that 
an originalist or process-perfecter would (2006, p. 94). This is not to say that 
judges, much less citizens, have an obligation to follow the past. Rather, it is to 




and be better accounts – if we can work up an account that fits and justifies the 
durable lines of doctrine. 
I do not offer a theory of precedent or stare decisis as such, nor do I justify 
following precedent for any of the reasons people commonly offer to justify 
this practice – reasons that Greene considers and rejects as inadequate (2012, 
pp. 190-99). As a matter of fact, I do not believe that anyone has a strong sense 
of obligation to follow precedent as such in constitutional interpretation. 
Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, I would argue – and thanks to Greene 
I now see this more clearly – entails rejecting any obligation to follow original 
meaning or precedent. As I have argued elsewhere (2006, pp. 226-27), if our 
Constitution were conceived merely as consisting of original expected 
applications or precedents, it would not deserve our fidelity. The Constitution, 
to be worthy of our fidelity, must reflect our aspirations to realize the ends 
proclaimed in the Preamble. For the Constitution to do that, we must reject any 
idea of an obligation to follow original expected applications or precedents as 
such. Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution entails fidelity in pursuit of our 
constitutional aspirations and ends. 
What is more, I do not see fit as I practice it as imposing an obligation to 
follow the past in a way that Greene would find objectionable. The dimension 
of fit basically does two things. First, it screens out purely utopian 
interpretations that have no claim on us by insisting upon showing the footing 
of the interpretation in our constitutional practice. Hence, even if we are 
constructing a moral reading – and even if we are giving primacy to 
justification – we give room for fit to show that the interpretation is an 
interpretation of our constitutional practice, not that of a perfectly just 
Constitution. Second, fit screens out off-the-wall interpretations (which are not 
necessarily utopian). Indeed, fit indicates that the proffered interpretation has a 
footing in our practice. 
Furthermore, if one conceives constitutional interpretation and justification 
as constructivist, as I do, one sees our principles as manifested in and growing 
out of our constitutional commitments and practice, not abstract ideas of what 
justice requires (Fleming 2006, pp. 6, 62, 66, 92-4). Within constructivism, one 
sees the dimension of fit as bound up with the dimension of justification: we 
are trying to work up the best justification for the extant materials of the 
constitutional practice. 
In response to Greene’s argument that Dworkin and I give too much 
deference or weight to precedent, I should clarify my views about the place of 
precedent in constitutional interpretation. I would say that, if one thinks of 
precedents as good-faith efforts to work out the best understanding of our 
constitutional commitments, one should give them some weight and approach 
them with some humility. I hasten to add that, to accept this approach, one 
need not and should not embrace a thoroughgoing Burkeanism. Greene (2012, 
pp. 194-95) aptly criticizes Burkean justifications for following precedent as 
such. One need not give precedents presumptive weight or ‘deference’, to use 




Ironically, moral readers and common law constitutionalists may give more 
weight to precedent than do originalists. For one thing, originalists officially 
give greater weight to concrete original meaning and are dubious about 
precedents they see as inconsistent with concrete original meaning (Balkin 
2011, p. 14). Indeed, some originalists, like Gary Lawson, reject precedent 
altogether (Lawson 2007, p. 4; Lawson 1994, p. 24). Others, like Justice 
Scalia, make a ‘pragmatic exception’ to originalism to accommodate precedent 
(Scalia 1997, p. 140). By contrast, moral readers and living constitutionalists 
(more precisely, common law constitutionalists) conceive the Constitution as a 
frame of government and scheme of abstract powers and rights, the meaning of 
which must be elaborated over time. They deny that the framers and ratifiers 
resolved our problems for us. Accordingly, they may give greater weight to 
interpreters’ good-faith efforts to work out the frame or scheme over time. I 
say ‘ironically’ because living constitutionalists always emphasize flexibility 
and change, and argue against being tied down by the past. Yet they may be 
more tied down by precedent than originalists are. This is so in part because 
they conceive of precedents as part of the constitutional practice that we are 
trying to carry on in a principled, coherent way. 
In my observation, though, no one, or hardly anyone, believes that we have 
a strong obligation to follow precedents as such. And this is as it should be. At 
any given time, a body of law will be riven by competing substantive ideals 
and competing approaches to interpretation. Proponents and opponents of a 
given view will win some cases and lose others. The conflicting views are 
embodied in the cases as they develop. And so, one cannot operate under a 
strong obligation to follow precedents as such and still make defensible 
decisions. 
Furthermore, as Sotirios Barber and I have argued (2007, pp. 135-40, 190), 
we cannot make recourse to precedent to avoid making moral and philosophic 
choices in constitutional interpretation. Instead, we use precedent and 
argument concerning its implications as a site on which to do battle over and 
choose among competing views. Thus, precedent is a site or battleground for 
making moral and philosophic choices. The precedents themselves do not 
settle the questions and make the choices for us. 
I do not consider it a weakness of precedent that people are willing to 
disregard it when they believe a previous case was wrongly decided, instead of 
adhere to it. Or, more likely, they argue that the precedent in its implications 
supports what they think is the best interpretation and the best moral and 
philosophic choice in the case before them. That is the strength of precedent! 
We argue about and from precedents, not because we have an obligation to 
follow them or because they decide our cases for us; instead, we do so to 
elaborate the meaning and best understanding of our constitutional 
commitments. We ask whether the precedent was rightly decided because we 
are striving to make our constitutional commitments the best they can be. 
Precedents inform our judgment and they provide evidence of the best 




judgments for us. We have to make those judgments ourselves: that is why we 
cannot and do not simply stand as decided. 
IV. TAKING FIDELITY SERIOUSLY ≠ INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO THE PAST 
In my book in progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I argue in 
the spirit of Dworkin that, if we aspire to fidelity to the Constitution, a moral 
reading is superior to originalism (at least all varieties of originalism besides 
Balkin’s abstract living originalism, which I interpret as a moral reading) 
(Fleming 2012a, pp. 1175-1177; Fleming 2012b, pp. 675-79). The aspiration to 
fidelity 
raises two fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity? 
The short answer to the first – fidelity to the Constitution – poses a 
further question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the 
Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact 
relatively concrete historical rules? . . . The short answer to the second – 
being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it – leads to another 
question: How should the Constitution be interpreted? Does faithfulness 
to the Fourteenth Amendment require recourse to political theory to 
elaborate general moral concepts or prohibit it and instead require 
historical research to discover relatively specific original understanding or 
meaning? And does the quest for fidelity in interpreting the Constitution 
exhort us to make it the best it can be or forbid us to do so in favor of 
enforcing an imperfect Constitution (Fleming 1997, p. 1335)?
 
Let’s begin with the question, Fidelity to what? My answer is fidelity to our 
abstract constitutional aspirations, including ends, principles, and basic 
liberties. Fidelity to our aspirations does not entail obligation to follow the past 
in the sense of either concrete original meaning or precedents. That would 
enshrine an imperfect Constitution that falls short of our aspirations and does 
not deserve our fidelity. We should treat precedents as evidence, factors, or 
resources, but not as obligations. They are to be taken into account, but 
followed only to the extent that they accord with our best understanding of our 
aspirations. 
Next, let’s consider the other question, What is fidelity? It is not fealty, or 
subservience. It is not following the authority of the past in the manner of an 
authoritarian originalism. Furthermore, it is not obligation to the concrete past, 
whether original meaning or precedents. Rather, fidelity is honoring our 
aspirations and pursuing our commitments by furthering our best 
understandings of them. The concrete original meaning and precedents are 
evidence of good-faith efforts to pursue those aspirations, but they are not the 
aspirations themselves. They have no doubt fallen short of our aspirations. If 
following those sources from the past dishonors our aspirations and 
undermines our commitments, we have good reasons to reject them in order to 




Moreover – to return to the question, Fidelity to what? – we should aspire to 
fidelity to our scheme as an ongoing frame of government pursuing the ends of 
the Preamble, not as a set of concrete original meanings or a string of 
precedents. Again, I do not say that we have an obligation to follow the 
concrete past, though I do say that we aspire to fidelity to the Constitution. 
How can we honor fidelity while rejecting obligation to the concrete past? 
If we conceive the Constitution as a frame of government, to be lived under 
and worked out over time, we can approach it with an attitude of fidelity but 
without an obligation of obedience to concrete expected applications or 
precedents. Fidelity on this understanding entails a commitment to making the 
frame of government work, to learning from experience, and to interpreting the 
Constitution so as to further its ends and realize its aspirations. 
Fidelity? Yes. Commitment? Yes. Obligation or obedience in an 
authoritarian sense to original expected applications or precedents? No. 
Fidelity is not obedience to decisions already made for us in the past by people 
who are long dead and who were ignorant of the challenges and problems of 
our age. Fidelity, rather, is an attitude of commitment to making the scheme 
work and to further developing it, building it out over time, as Balkin puts it 
(2011, p. 5), in ways to better realize its ends and our aspirations. Or, as 
Dworkin and I put it (Dworkin 1986, p. 255; Fleming 2006, pp. 16, 211, 225, 
227), to making the Constitution the best it can be. 
V. FIT AND JUSTIFICATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Finally, I shall assess Greene’s formulations about the ‘primacy of 
justification’ and ‘room for fit’. Greene argues (2012, pp. 201-06) against 
interpretive obligation to follow the past, but he allows ‘room for fit’. He 
acknowledges that in particular cases there can be good reasons for following 
past decisions. As Balkin puts it (2011, pp. 256-59), evidence of concrete 
original meanings and precedents serve as a resource, not a constraint, in 
constitutional interpretation. Similarly, Greene says (2012, pp. 192, 197, 206) 
that they serve as a factor, not an obligation. 
I agree completely with Greene’s conception of ‘room for fit’ (2012, pp. 
204-06). Yet he says that people like Dworkin and me want to treat fit as more 
than a factor (Greene 2012, p. 192-93, 196-97). Greene conceives of a 
presumption of deference as lying on the terrain between fit being a factor and 
fit being an obligation and situates Dworkin and me at that point. I think that 
Dworkin and I give similar room for fit, and we similarly treat fit as a factor 
though not an obligation. If I appear to treat fit as more than a factor, I suspect 
that it is simply because I have attempted to provide a corrective to Dworkin’s 
work – to do as he says, not as he does. I suspect that most readers outside our 
family quarrel would argue that Dworkin and I, like Greene, do give primacy 
to justification over fit (or indeed that we give too little room for fit). 
I would resist framing the issue in terms of whether fit or justification has 




There is no raw or bare fit that is prior to or apart from justification, nor is 
there any justification divorced from fit that has any purchase on us. 
What is more, I do not believe that Greene has made the case for the 
primacy of justification over fit. He has, admittedly, made the case for the 
unavoidability of justification as well as fit, and the inextricable connection 
between them. I would argue instead that fit and justification are co-original 




Both are inherently involved in constitutional 
interpretation. Both stem from the basic aim of developing the best 
interpretation. 
In places, Dworkin (1986, pp. 65-6) almost seems to regret drawing the 
distinction between the two dimensions of fit and justification. Doing so is 
important for analytical clarity, but it may lead people to see the two 
dimensions as more distinct than they are, as if they correspond to a two-step 
process. And it may lead them to view the two dimensions as sequential rather 
than as dimensions of a holistic judgment: as in, first we fit and then we justify 
(Solum 2010, pp. 553-54). And it may lead them to argue that one or the other 
is primary. For example, they might argue that ‘fit is everything’, to the 
exclusion of justification (McConnell 1997, p. 1292). Or, even if fit is not 
everything, that fit has primacy over justification. Or, to the contrary, that 
justification has primacy over fit. This is what Greene argues (2012, pp. 201-
04). 
In Securing Constitutional Democracy, I spoke (2006, pp. 5, 63, 84, 92-3, 
97-8) of the best interpretation as that which provides the best fit with and 
justification of the constitutional document, order, and practice. Thus, I 
purposely avoided splitting up these two dimensions. Having said that, I should 
acknowledge that I do make a fit case for my theory of securing constitutional 
democracy. But I hasten to add that, at the same time, I make the case that my 
theory justifies our constitutional document, order, and practice. 
In writing the book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions with 
Sotirios Barber, I initially wanted to refer to the two dimensions of fit and 
justification, but Barber insisted that we avoid this distinction. For him, 
interpretation is just a matter of giving the best account of honoring 
constitutional commitments and furthering constitutional ends. I have come to 
see the wisdom of this view of fit and justification as inextricably bound 
together in the idea of giving the best account. 
At the same time, I should emphasize that there is analytical power and 
clarity in distinguishing fit and justification and acknowledge that I myself 
have distinguished the two in my own work (Fleming 2006; Fleming 1997, pp. 
1348-1352). As against those who argue that ‘fit is everything’, I have argued 
that fit alone is insufficient to resolve the clash between competing 
interpretations in hard cases. We have to resort to justification to do so. As 
stated above, my taking fit seriously shows that my moral readings have a firm 
 
1
 I apply the idea ‘co-original and of equal weight’ in analogous contexts 




footing in our constitutional practice. Furthermore, fit enables people to see 
their aspirations in the Constitution. Finally, fit enables us to criticize others’ 
views as revisionist, radical, or subversive. For example, I can criticize the Tea 
Party as revisionist, radical, and subversive because they cannot even fit much 
of our twenty-first century constitutional practice. To be sure, I can also 
criticize them on normative grounds of justification: they have a deficient, 
unjust normative theory, one moreover that falls short of or misses the mark on 
our aspirations in the Preamble to the Constitution. 
These uses of fit show the analytical power, in certain contexts, of stressing 
fit. But that is not to say that, even here, fit is entirely distinct from 
justification. To recall Greene’s formulation (2012, pp. 192, 197, 206), I would 
say that, in these ways, fit is a factor in constitutional interpretation. In my 
book, I shall say more about how fit factors in constitutional interpretation – 
even perfectionist interpretation that aspires to interpret the Constitution so as 
to make it the best it can be and worthy of our fidelity. 
I doubt that Greene would object to what I have said here about fit and 
justification. To recapitulate: if I seem to give primacy to fit over justification, 
it is because I strive to show that my theory – though a Constitution-perfecting 
theory – is a theory of our constitutional order, not one of a perfect liberal 
Constitution. Like Greene, I view fit with original meaning and precedent as a 
resource for deciding constitutional meaning, as a factor in making 
constitutional decisions, and as evidence of the content of our commitments 
and indeed of political justice. Even though interpreters do not have an 
obligation to follow the past, they may be more effective in persuading people 
that their interpretations are faithful to the Constitution’s aspirations if they can 
make an argument that their interpretation both fits with and justifies the 
constitutional document, underlying constitutional order, and evolved 
constitutional practice. 
Finally, I would like to make an observation concerning Michael Seidman’s 
evident view, in his book Constitutional Disobedience, related to fit and 
justification. If Greene would give primacy to justification over fit, it seems 
that Seidman (2013, pp. 11-28) would throw out fit altogether and the 
Constitution along with it. As he titled an op-ed piece in the New York Times: 
‘Let’s [g]ive up on the Constitution’ (Seidman 2012, p. A19). Evidently that 
would leave only normative arguments about the best thing to do. It is not clear 
to me that normative arguments without regard to fit with the extant 
constitutional document, doctrine, and practice will be superior to our current 
forms of argument. Normative arguments tend to be more persuasive to people 
when they are cast in terms of realizing our commitments and aspirations than 
when they are cast simply as arguments for an ideal state of affairs. Similarly, I 
believe that, to a greater degree than is commonly appreciated, normative 
argument, at least in our political and constitutional culture, is more 
constructivist than utopian. It articulates the ideals implicit in our practices. 
Seidman might say this is a bad thing – that it shows the degree to which the 




But I believe that our thinking about justice is enriched through constructivism, 
as compared with what it would be like if we did away with the Constitution or 
simply asked ourselves what justice requires as a utopian matter (Seidman 
2013, pp. 139-43). Constitutional arguments that fit and justify our 
constitutional document and practice exert a greater claim on people than do 
utopian arguments, for the former are arguments about the best understanding 
of our practices, commitments, and aspirations. 
But this is not to say that in keeping the Constitution, instead of doing away 
with it, we are saying we have an interpretive obligation to follow the past. 
Similarly, we are not engaging in constitutional disobedience if we reject 
concrete original meaning or precedents. To the contrary, I would argue that by 
doing so we are pursuing constitutional fidelity. 
In the passage quoted in the epigraph with which I began this Essay, Justice 
Holmes (1920, p. 139) famously wrote that ‘historic continuity with the past is 
not a duty, it is only a necessity’. I suppose that Holmes meant that somehow 
there is no avoiding following the past. I do not endorse Holmes’s evidently 
deterministic view. I, like Greene, would agree with Holmes that following the 
past is not a duty. Unlike Holmes, however, I would say that it is a necessity in 
the weaker sense that, to be persuasive in our constitutional culture, one 
generally needs to argue that one’s interpretations fit with the past, show the 
past in its best light (as Dworkin and I put it), or redeem the promises of our 
abstract moral commitments and aspirations (as Balkin puts it) (Balkin 2011, 
pp. 74-81). This is not originalism. It is a moral reading that aspires to fidelity 
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